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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
HAWAIIAN EQUIPMENT COM-
PANY, 
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vs. 
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THE EIMC·O CO.RPORATIO·N, a 
corporation, 
A ~pel!Jant .. 
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F I I F, DvrLLIS w. RITTER ~ -.A ~ JESSER. S. BUDGE 
"! ...... ~glg 
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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
HAWAIIAN EQUIP~1ENT COM-
PANY, 
Respondent, 
Cas·e No. 
vs. 7188 
THE EIMCO CORPORATION, a 
corporation, 
A ppel!Jant. 
PE.TITION FOiR REHEARING 
Comes now the ap·pellant and respectfully petitions 
the cou~t to set aside its judgment in the above entitled 
cause and to grant a rehearing herein upon the follow-
ing grounds : 
1. That the court has miseonceived the nature of 
this action and has decided the case upon a theory not 
pleaded or relied upon by the p[aintiff; and that in 
adopting said theory the court holds that: there has been 
a compliance with the statute of frauds when it affirma-
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2 
tively appears, w~thout dispute, that as to the cause of 
action pleaded in the complaint there has heen no com-
pliance wi~h said statute. 
2. Conceding that a p·arty may be permitted to 
recover upon a theory not pleaded or relied upon, the 
court neveritheless erred in ~permitting an oral issue of 
fact involving such theory to be resolved by the jury when 
the statute of frauds ·demands that such issue involving 
an ess·ential term of the contract should have been fore-
closed by the written memorandum. 
3. The cour1t has not only imp,aired the effective-
ness of the stRtute of frauds (Section 81-1-4) but ~his 
decision if adhered to, will utterly destroy it as a rule 
of :evidence in this State. 
WILLIS V\T. RITTER 
JESS. R. S. BUDGE 
Attorneys for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE 
W·e, the undereigned attorneys for appellant, do 
hereby cer,tify that in our op~inion there is good ~eason 
to believe the judgment rendered herein is erroneous 
and that the caus·e ought to be re-·examined. 
WILLIS W. RITTER 
JE.SSE R. S. BUDGE 
Attorneys for Appel~ant 
ARGUMENT 
This court, as a basis for its later dicission, quotes 
from Rest,atement of the' Law, Contracts, Sec. 207, to 
the ·effect that the memorandum required by the statute 
of frauds must state with reasonable certainty: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
•' The land, goods or other subject n1atter 
to which the contract relates, the tern1s and con-
ditions of all the pro1nises consti~tuting the con-
tract and by whon1 and to \Yhonl the pro1nises 
are made,'' 
followed by the cormnent of the eo1npilers of tha.t volume 
that: 
The degree of particularity with which the 
terms of the contract * * * must be set out can-
not be reduced to an exact forn1ula.. There must 
be reasonable certainty and there must be ac-
curacy, but the possibility need not be excluded 
that some other subjeet matter * * * wil'l also fall 
within the words of the writing." 
The court then identifies one of the p~articular issues 
presented on the appeal, to-wit, the sufficiency of the 
memorandum signe·d by the p~arty to be charged. It 
concludes that because of--~the familiarity of the parties 
with the merchandis·e involved in the transaction, they 
understood to what the words ''reference hammers'' 
related and that parol evidence was admissibJe to ap:pily 
the memorandum to the subj·ect matter. The court th·en 
holds the memorandum to be sufficient. 
We now come to those statements in the opinion 
which we £e:el constitute a false basis for the court's 
conclusion. Says his Honor, Judge Latimer: 
"The p·rinciple that the goods must he identi-
fied and the other terms and conditions set forth 
with reasonable cer,tainty must be considered in 
connection with the knowledge and relationship of 
the parties and trade usages to determine whether 
the contents of the memorandum sufficiently con-
veyed to the parties involved an identity of the 
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subject matter and a reasonabl certainty of the 
d d. · * * * Th t· other terms an con 1t1ons. e par 1es 
represented business interests which were fa-
miliar with the articles being sold and under-
stood the meaning to be given the words 'ham-
mers' and 'scalHrs '. The use of the abbreviated 
phrase 'ref'erence hammers' presupposed some 
prior discussion with reference to harnmers. 
While the use of abbreiViated phrases may render 
the writing unintelligible ito an uninstructed per-
son, the phras-e may still have meaning when 
view·ed in the light of circumstances surround-
ing the· sending of the cablegran1. When this 
court scrutinizes the language of the cablegram 
it gives the words used the meaning ascribed to 
them by rn·erchants who are familiar with their 
usage and have occasion to deal with them in the 
commercial world. If by giving the words such 
meaning the subject matter is intelligently identi-
fied and the terms and conditions are fairly dis-
closed then parol evidence is admissible for a 
limited purpose. While this type of evidence is 
not competent to contradict or vary th~e terms of 
a memorandum to show what is intended, the 
situation o.f the parties and the surrounding cir-
cumstances at the time the contract was made 
may be shown by such proof to apply the memo-
randum to the subj·ect matter. The cablegram is 
not so lacking in details as to amount to a nullity 
and when it is interpreted in the light of the sur-
rounding facts and ·circumstances any deficiencies 
are supplied and the instrument then becomes 
ce~tain in all its terms. The conditions are not 
changed or modified; th-ey are explained and the 
explanation makes it possible to de~termine fro1n 
the cablegram what appellant was offering to 
purchase. The -cablegram, even though not a 
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model of clarity, 'Yas sufficient to full~r diselose 
the essential tern1s of the offer and parol evidence 
was admissible for the purpose of ap~plying the 
tern1s of the eablegral:\1 to the sale of the ham-
mers.'' 
Well, if it is sufficien't, there is no memorandum-
and this is our firm conviction-there is no memorandum 
in any case where parties, both of whom are esp:ecially 
familiar with the merchandise which is the subject of 
the contract, which cannot he sup~plemented by suffi-
cient parol evidence in order to make it enforceable 
notwithstanding the statute of frauds. The parties may 
have been thoroughly familiar with the words or lan-
guage used in the business to which their transaction 
related; they may even have ·agreed on all the terms of 
a contract so that they understood one ano'ther p~er­
fectly, but that is not sufficient. The te·rms of their 
understanding and all the essential terms must he re-
duced 1to writing and sign·e'd by the p~arty to be charged. 
In the cablegram, which, in this case, must constitute 
the ''memorandum'' required by th;e statute, there is 
no statement whatever: 
(a) of quantities, kinds or makes of hammers; or 
(b) of what is meant by "will take all," 'vhether 
all pJaintiff had in S'tock, or all it would ac-
quire, or all it might elect to sell. 
Of course we argued this point in our brief, but we 
again sugges1t it because we cannot believe that this 
court wishes to nullify the statute by saying, in effect, 
that the knowledge of the p~arties concerning the sub-
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ject matter of 'the ·contract justifies reading into the 
memorandum a specific descri:ption of the property sup-
plied by parol, in order to make the memorandum com-
ply with the statute. The court 8-ays that 
''The cablegram is not so lacking in detail~ 
as to amount to a nullity." 
What details does it gi¥e1 I1t merely says ''Reference 
hammers bid maximum twenty-four dollars each scalers 
17.'50 each Honolulu will take all.'' If the court will 
please refer to paragraph 3 of the complaint, it will ob-
serve that the respondent alleges an ''·agf"!e:ement im, 
w·nititng'' for the sale of equipment by qwootity and 
d~escription and that it p·artieularly specifies the models 
and makes and numbers .of each mo,del and rlvake of both 
scaling and chipping hamm·ers which it claims were the 
subject matter of the contract. The contract as it is al-
leged, is the contract upon which respondent relied 
and which i1t attempted to prove. If th·ere was such a 
contract it embraced, of course, a specification of all 
these different models and ma~es of hammers and the 
numbers of each model and make; and with the ommis-
sion of all'these details of the contract, the court, never-
theless, states that it was not so lacking in details that 
parol evidence was not permissible to add all these 
details to the contract in order 1to make it enforceable 
under the statute of frauds. 
For our pr~esent purpose, we may concede that there 
was ''p-rior discussion'' ·and 'that the parties understood 
the character of merchandis·e which was the subject of 
their negotiations. We may concede that they discussed 
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tained. We may ·even concede that they specified the 
nu1nbers of hammers (although th·e evidence ·does not 
show tha;t the numbers talked about corres:ponded with 
the allegations in the complaint) but, with all thes·e con-
cessions, ev-en though they n1ight establish the fact that 
a contract was made, it nevertheless was not an enporce-
able contract. The statute of frauds does not say that 
persons may not exercise the right to contract by deal-
ings in parol or by dealings partly in parol and partly in 
writing, but it does declare that a contract to se-ll goods 
of the value of $500.00 or upwards shall not be enforce-
able by action ''unless * * * some note or memorandum 
in writing of the contract of sale is signed by the party 
to be charge·d or his agent in that behalf.'' 
Let us suppose, by way of example, that two live-
S1tock men enter into negotiations for the sale and pur-
chase of cattle and after they had dis-cussed the matter 
over the telephone, the buyer should telepgraph : 
''Reference livestock. Will take all. Steers 
Seventy-Five Dollars Heif·ers Sixty-Five Dollars 
Calves 'Twenty-Five Dollars.'' 
Would such a m·emorandum he sufficient to sustain a 
complaint wherein it is alleged: 
'' 1. That plaintiff and defendafllt entered 
into an agreement in writing as follows: That on 
or about the ------------ day of ____________________ , ___________________ _ 
the defendant offered and agreed to purchase 
from plaintiff, and on or about the ------------ day of 
-------------------------------------------~---------------- the plaintiff ac-
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cepted said offer and agreed to sell to the defen-
dant certain cattle designated as steers, heifers 
and calves for the price and upon the terms and 
conditions hereinafter alleged. 
'' 2. That the quantity and deseri ption of 
said lives1tock which defendant agreed to pur-
chase from the plaintiff, as aforesaid, are as 
follows: 
Steers H ei.fers 
50 Durham 25 J·ersey 
60 He.reford 40 Holstein 
80 Poled Angus 30· Guernsey 
Calves 
60 Herefords 
90 Guernsey 
75 Durham 
Would such a state of faCJts differ, in principle, from the 
facts in the ease~ Would the supposed memorandum 
comply with the statute of frauds~ Based on such a 
memorandum, could the s·ellei recover for 50 Durham 
steers, 40 Holetein heifers, el r.. ~ Could he show by 
parol the numbers nf ~ac.h class and kind which were 
the subject of the con1tract ~ Would the case not fall 
squarely within the rule announced in Ellis v. Dentve1r & 
Rio Grand R1ailrooad, (Colo.) 43 Pac. 457, where the court 
said: 
''All agree that the terms of the bargain 
must be so stated as to render it possible there-
from to gather what the p·arties have agreed to. 
Tested by this very gen·eral rule which is suffi-
cient for our purpose, a simple insrpection of the 
memorandum will demonstrate its insufficiency. 
We are unadvised hy its terms w·hat nu.mber of 
ties ·of the various descrip~tions were agreed t~n 
be d,e~ivered b-y the cont.raat'rbng p~arty." (Italics 
ours) 
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Wili the court pleas-e again read this case and Wil-
liston on Contracts Rev. Ed. Vol. II, p. 578, an·d other 
authorities cited at pages 11 to 20 of our brief, and 
see, also Bw.rley ~f}c. C:o. v. Onken Brothe~rs, (Wyo.) 183 
Pac. 747. 
We most respectfully eontentlthat this court's. state-
ment that ''the ·cablegram, ·even though not a model of 
clarity, was sufficient to fully disclose 1the essentiai terms 
of the offe·r and parol ·evidence was admissible for the 
purpose of applying the- terms of the cablegram to the 
sale of the hammers,'' is erroneous and this court ought 
not to ~permit such a construction of 1the s·tatute to 
stand. Can the document in this cas·e be so supplemented 
by parol as to ·establish a contract for th~e sale of ·the 
particular e·quipment specified in 1the complaint? Is, it 
sufficient to say, and we make this remark with all due 
respect to the· court, that 
''Although the goods were m·erely described 
as 'hammers' and 'scalers' each party in effect 
concedes that these terms of the cablegram were 
understood by them to refer to 'chipping ham-
mers ' and ' scaling h·ammers ' ' '. 
As we have heretoforie remarked, suppose it was 
so understood by both parities, was it also understood 
that there were 418 model K-1 Inge·rsoll-Rand Comp·any 
scaling hammers, 1250 model FC Chicago Pneumatic 
Tool Company scaling hammers, 140 model MM Indepen-
dent Pneumatic Tool Company scaling hammers, etc., 
and also 708 model No. 2 Master Pn·eum-atic Tool Com-
pany chipping hammers and 188 model 2 Chicago Pneu-
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matic Tool Company chipping hammers' And even if 
we should assume· that the words ''chipping harmners'' 
and ''scaling hammers'' were meant by 'the parties to 
include these various models and makes specified in 
the complaint, we ar,e, af.ter all, here concerned with 
whether there is before the court an enforceable con-
tract unde·r the statute, not with what the parties under-
stood. The only contract prove·d, if respondent proved 
a ·contract, is made up of the memorandum and of the 
parol evidence specifying the particular descripitions of 
the particular equipment according to model, make and 
number of ·each. Did not such parol evidence add terms 
to the written memorandum in order to make out all the 
terms of the contract which shou!ld have been s-et forth in 
the memorandum alone~ 
But this eourt goes. further. To quote: 
''The point on which the parties divide i~ 
the unce~tainty concerning the make, 1nodel and 
number of each kind of hammers involved in 
the -contemplated purchase. Although the testi-
mony on behalf of the piarties on the question of 
the makes involved in the government offering 
is in direct conflict, t.he jury resolved the evidence 
im f(JIIJor of respondewt wnd found the tools sub-
stO!Ybt~ally as repres~ented. The sa.le belitng by lot 
rather th(JJ}'b by iVfl)d~"vid!wal descrip1tvon, the evi-
dence oonce:rniln.g identificat~on w·as sufficient to 
remove any uncevrtarimty abowt the make or 
m01del." (Italics ours) 
Of course our contention is that the court should never 
have permitted the jury to ''resolve 1the evidence- in favor 
of the respondent'' because no enforceable contract for 
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the sale of any hammers had been proved. 'That was the 
reason for appellant'~ request for a directed verdict. 
Furthermore, how can the court say ~that the sale, was 
''by lot rather than by individual description'' in face 
of the allegations of the complaint which specifically set 
forth a contract for the sale of certain goods by a p,ar~ 
ticular description as to kind, model, make and the num-
ber of ·each~ And this contract, as they alleged it, re-
spondent was, of course, bound to prove. This court 
would not, of course, intentionally make a misstatement 
and it cannot wish to permi1t such a misstatement to 
operate as the basis for upholding as sufficient, evidenee 
by parol of a bulk or lot sale contract when no such con-
tract was pleaded or relied upon. Respondent must stand 
or fall on the contract he pleads and which it contends 
is enforcible becau~·e all necessary terms are embraced 
within the ''memorandum signed by the p 1arty to be 
charged.'' It cannot claim a valid sale by lot. That is 
not what it alleged the con tract to be. It is this c:ourt 
that advances that theory. If a par'ty should attempt to 
change his theory on app~eal, this court would not permi1t 
it to do so. Crarne v. Judge, 30 Utah 50, 83 Pac. 566. 
According to the opinion, the court has changed the 
theory for res'Pondent, and, upon the assumption that 
the sale was ''by lot,'' holds the evidence of identification 
to be sufficient when, as before stated, the plaintiff itself 
specifically describes the particular items and kind of 
equipment it declares appellant agreed to buy. This 
court holds in effect that it was p~roper to permit the 
jury ''to resolve this evidence'' (that is, the oral evi-
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dence) "in favor of respondent'' and thus estabish with 
sufficient certainty the models and makes of the equip-
men't -so as to give rise to a contract for sale "by lo·t." 
If the jury can resolve disp~utes between the parties as 
to the identity of the goods, that is, as to ''the makes in-
volved" or as to any other essen1tial term of a contract, of 
what use is the statute of frauds~ Such an issue was 
submitted to the jury at early common law, but it was 
to put a s1top to the tem·ptation to perjury involved in 
trying out such an issue by oral evidence that this ancient 
statute was passed. Its purpose was, and is, to put a 
s~top to one p~art.y ·claiming orally what goods were sold 
by lot or by des·cription and other p~arty claiming orally 
the opposite. Tha.t the statute is salutory is evidenced by 
the fact 1that in all English speaking countries, it has 
been adopted. We most resp.ectfully point out that the 
very fact that an issue of fact relating to an essen1tial 
term in the bargain exists, is of its~e:lf sufficient proof 
that the s\~at,ut;e has wot been comp,lie:d with. W·ether the 
goods were sold "as is" or "by lot" or "by description" 
should be settled and determined by the writing itself 
as an ess~ential term of the contract. It was for this 
reason, among others, that we urged upon the court 
below that the respondent cannot recover as a matter of 
law, since this, a controlling issue in the case~, should have 
been s·ettled and determined by the cablegrams-the offer 
and the acceptance-and because these writing are 
entirely silent on this issue, that deficiency cannot be 
suppfLied by making an oral disputed issue of fact out 
of it to be disposed of by the jury. For the trial court to 
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overrule our motion and submit the issue to the jury, 
would have been regular in all respects but for the sta-
tute, which makes any eontract, all essential terms of 
which are not embodied in a m·emorandum in writing 
signed by the party to be charged, unenforcible. 
We really feel that should a similar case hereafter 
come before this court, there would not be an adherence 
to 1the doctrine h·ere announced, to-wit, that a plaintiff 
may declare, on a written contract of sale and 1purchase 
of specific !JOiods by specifti;c desor~pt~ovn and without any 
written memorandum containing any specification of 
such goods either by kind, make, model, quantity or type, 
may recover on such allegHd contract because both p~ar­
ties, being familiar with the particular p~roperty, knew 
what was intended and tha:t parol ·evidence may he re-
sorted to supp1ly each and all of the deficiencies in the 
terms of the contract. It really makes. no differ•ence how 
much information the parties possessed, or that each 
knew what the other intended, or whe,ther they in fact 
made a contract, the question her:e is did they make an 
enfowrceabZe contraet? 
Then on the question as to whether the acceptance 
of the offer was or was not conditional. The court, in 
effect, says that becaus.e app~el1ant knew that the p~ro­
perty, whatever it was, was to be obtained from gov-
ernment surplus, that fact should he read into 1he memo-
randum to m.ake it read: 
''Reference hammers such as the government 
has in its surplus stock, bid maximwn t'venty-
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14 
four dollars each scalers 17.50 each, Honolulu 
Will take all. ' ' 
or 
''Reference hammers, bid maximum t,ven-
ty-four dollars each scalers 17.50 each Honolulu 
Will take all of which you can secure delivery 
from government surplus.'' 
If such had been the offer (memorandum) then, dis-
regarding for this discussion, the defect as to description 
of the property, the reply to respondent ''subject to de-
livery from surplus'' would have been an aooe1ptance in 
the terms of the offer, but when it is necessary to add 
to the memorandum by parol such terms of the off·er 
as that the proper1ty intended compTised a certain num-
ber of eertain models and makes of different kinds of 
hammers to be delivered to or obtained by respondent 
from a government stock pile, it results that two-thirds 
of the 1terms of the contract rest in parol. 
We feel that this court has misconceived the charac-
ter of this action and has given a latitude of construction 
to the statute of frauds and its application as to render 
that statute meaningless and useless permitting ''sur-
rounding circumstances" to outweigh the sta!tute 's plain 
requirements. 
We most respectfully urge that a re-hearing should 
be granted. 
WILLIS W. RITTER 
JE,SSE R. S. BUDGE 
Attorneys fovr A.ppel~wnt 
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